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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
V-1 OIL COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ANCHOR PETROLEUM 
COMPANY, 
Respondent, 
Case No. 8878 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON 
INTERMEDIXTE APPEAL 
STATEMEN'T OF THE CASE 
The defendant, appellant here, entered into a 
contract with plaintiff and respondent which the 
plaintiff "accepted and agreed to" on the 6th day 
of September, 1954. ( R. 5) . The con tract provided, 
in part: 
* * * Quantity: The quantity shall be all 
of the Buyer's requirements up to a maxi-
mum quantity of 40,000 gallons per month 
and a minimum quantity of 20,000 per month, 
quantities subject to change by mutual agree-
ment.*** 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff returned the "accepted and agreed 
to" contract to defendant together with a letter 
which read as follows: 
Enclosed find contracts executed which 
you forwarded September 1, 1954. 
It appears that we are going to be a little 
slow in starting, but I am sure we will use 
the total commitment in the next year. (R. 6). 
Plaintiff purchased no petro'leum from defen-
dant in the month of September, 1954; in October, 
1954 plaintiff placed three orders for petroleum in 
the following amounts: 2,797 gallons, 2,617 gallons 
and 6,581 gallons for a total of 11,995 gallons which 
defendant supplied. On November 16, 1954 plain-
tiff purchased 6,546 gallons of petroleum from de-
fendant. Under date of November 17, 1954 defen-
dant wrote plaintiff as follows: 
Register Mail 
Return Receipt Requested 
V-1 Oil Company 
Idaho Falls, 
Idaho 
Gentlemen: 
Please refer to our contract with you dated 
August 31, 1954, effective September 1, 1954, 
covering the purchase by you from us of cer-
tain quantities of LP Gas. 
You are hereby notified that, due to your fail- ,,~, 
ure since September 1, 1954 to purchase from 4 
us, in accordance with the terms of the con-
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tract, the minimum monthly quantities of LP 
Gas called for by the contract, the contract is 
hereby cancelled and terminated effective 
November 30, 1954. 
(Pretrial Exhibit 4) . 
Yours very truly, 
AN·CHOR PETROLEUM 
COMPANY 
By /s/ C. L. Parkhill, Jr. 
C. L. Parkhill, Jr. 
Sales Manager 
Western Division 
Plaintiff received this cancellation and term-
ination of the contract on November 19, 1954. (Pre-
trial Exhibit 4). Thereafter, on November 21st and 
on November 22nd plain tiff made two additional 
purchases of 6,507 gallons each. The defendant de-
clined to supply plaintiff with petroleum after Nov-
ember 30, 1954. 
Plaintiff's contention is that the letter which 
accompanied the "accepted and agreed to" contract 
was a counter offer which modified the terms of the 
written agreement as to the minimum monthly 
quantities plaintiff was required to purchase in the 
performance of his agreement. 
Defendant contends that plaintiff breached the 
agreement and that defendant was entitled to term-
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inate the agreement in accord with the terms of the 
final paragraph thereof which reads as follows: 
WAIVER: The waiver of either party 
of any breach of any provision hereof by the 
other party shall not be deemed to be a waiver 
of the breach of any other provision or pro-
visions hereof, or of any subsequent or con-
tinuing breach of such provision or provi-
sions. Either party, at its option, may term-
inate this agreement at any time upon writ-
ten notice, if the other party violates or fails 
to perform any of the provisions hereof. 
Under the above facts defendant moved in the 
Court below for summary judgment which was de-
nied. From the ruling of the trial court defendant 
brings this interlocutory appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
There is no controversy as to the wording of 
the written instrument; i.e., the contract between 
plaintiff and defendant. Neither is there dispute 
between the parties as to plaintiff's letter of Sep-
tember 6, 1954 which accompanied the "accepted 
and agreed to" L.P. - Gas Sales Contract which 
plaintiff executed and returned to defendant on said 
date. The plaintiff has not denied and cannot deny 
receipt of the cancellation and termination notice 
of November 17, 1954 (Pre-trial Exhibit 4). 
The sole and only question presented to this 
Court is: 
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Was the defendant entitled to terminate 
the agreement in accordance with the terms 
thereof? 
In other words, were the parties bound by the 
terms of their written agreement? 
On the 16th day of March, A.D. 1957, the 
deposition of Sam Bennion, Secretary-Treasurer 
and General Manager of the V-1 Oil Company was, 
pursuant to stipulation between the attorneys for 
the respective parties, taken. This is a family cor-
poration of which Faye Bennion, wife of Sam Ben-
nion, is president and one Albert S. Baker is vice-
president. ( Dep. 3) . The deposition of Sam Bennion 
shows that negotiations between the parties com-
menced as early as January, February or March 
of 1954; (Dep. 3) ; that on September 6, 1954, Sam 
Bennion signed a contract for the purchase of liquid 
petroleum from the defendant Anchor Petroleum 
Company. (Dep. 3). The deposition further shows: 
Q. I suppose you read the contract and 
studied it before you signed it, didn't you? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Was it satisfactory then, as far as 
you were concerned? 
A. Yes sir. 
Further defendant admits having received no 
reply to the letter upon which he relies for his con-
tention that there was a ''counter offer"; the letter 
of September 6, 19154. 
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And: 
Q. You refer in your complaint to a 
letter you wrote to the company, dated Sep-
tember 6th, which may relate to the contract, 
which reads : 
''Gentlemen: Enclosed find contract 
executed which you forwarded Sep-
tember 1, 1954. It appears we are 
going to be a little slow in starting, 
but I am sure we will use the total 
commitment in the next year." 
Did you ever get any answer from the 
Anchor people to this letter? 
A. No. Sir. 
* * * * 
(Dep. 9, 10). 
Q. Have you received from Anchor Pet-
roleum Company any letters answering your 
letter to them of September 6th? 
A. Well, I received the contract back, 
signed. 
Q. Yes. I said letters? 
A. Not that I recall, no sir. 
* * * * 
(Dep. 15). 
Plaintiff further admits that defendant was 
always able, ready and willing to perform under 
the contract: 
Q. Is it your contention, Mr. Bennion, 
that the Anchor Petroleum Company did not 
deliver you, or did not supply you with the 
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products you wanted, when you wanted them, 
after you signed that contract in the amounts 
you wanted, that they were not able to? 
A. They refused to supply us after can-
cellation of the contract. 
Q. That was after cancellation of the 
contract, but what you said in your testimony, 
they assured you they would have sufficient 
products for you at all times. Now, was there 
any time during the time from when you 
signed the contract on September 6th, until 
the contract was cancelled on November 30th, 
tha:t they didn't have sufficient product avail-
able for you if you wanted to buy it? 
A. No sir, they always had product for 
us when we went down to Utah Oil to load up. 
* * * * (Dep. 19, 20). 
The plaintiff claims for other meetings and 
telephone calls with representatives of the defendant 
company pertaining to oral conversations, all of 
which defendant contends must be rejected as being 
violative of the parol evidence rule. 
This is all there is to the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AN ACCEPTANCE WHICH IMPOSES 'TERMS NOT 
PRESENT IN THE OFFER HAS NO VALIDITY AND 
IS MERELY A COUNTER OFFER. 
If we were to accept the contention of plain-
tiff that the letter of September 6, 1954 was in-
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tended to modify the terms of the agreement as to 
required purchases then it must follow that there 
was no acceptance of the offer but in fact a rejection 
and a counter proposition which left the parties with 
no agreement at all. Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts. Section 58 reads: 
Acceptance must be unequivocal in order 
to create a con tract. 
Section 59 reads: 
Except as this rule is qualified by §§ 45, 
63, 72, an acceptance must comply exactly 
with the requirements of the offer, omitting 
nothing from the promise or performance re-
quested. 
Section 60 reads : 
A reply to an offer, though purporting to 
accept it, which adds qualifications or re-
quires performance of conditions, is not an 
acceptance but is a counter-offer. 
Comment a. A qualified or conditional 
acceptance is a counter-offer, since such an 
acceptance is a statement of an exchange that 
the person making it is willing to make, dif .. 
fering from that proposed by the original of-
ferer. A counter-offer is a rejection of the 
original offer * * *. 
Williston on Contracts has this to say under Sec-
tion 73: 
In order to make a bargain it is necessary 
that the acceptor shall give in return for the 
offerer's promise exactly the consideration 
which the offerer requests. If an act is re-
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quested, that very act and no other must be 
given. If a prmnise is requested, that promise 
must be made absolutely and unqualifiedly. 
This does not mean necessarily that the pre-
cise words of the requested promise must be 
repeated, but by a positive and unqualified 
assent to the proposal the acceptor must in 
effect agree to make precisely the promise re-
quested; and if any provision is added to 
which the offerer did not assent, the conse-
quence is not merely that this provision is not 
binding and that no contract is for1ned, but 
that the offer is rejected. 
And, under Section 77 of that work: 
A conditional acceptance is in effect a 
statement that the offeree is willing to enter 
into a bargain differing in some respect from 
that proposed in the original offer. The con-
ditional acceptance is, therefore, itself a coun-
ter-offer and rejects the original offer, so that 
thereafter even an unqualified acceptance of 
that offer will not form a contract. 
!This Court adheres to the above rules in the 
case of R. J. Daum Construction Company v. Child, 
122 Utah 194, 247 P. 2d 817. 
In Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp9ra-
tion, 115 U. 590, 207 P. 2d 794, This Court said: 
* * * An acceptance which imposes terms 
or conditions not present in the offer has no 
validity and * * * its only recognition is as a 
counter offer * * * 
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POINT II. 
ALL PRIOR AND CONTEMPORANEOUS NEGO-
TIATIONS BETWEEN THE P AR'TIES WERE MERG-
ED IN THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
At pre-trial and throughout the proceedings 
below, plaintiff has contended that the letter of Sep-
tember 6, 1954 was regarded 'by him as a "counter 
offer." If such was held to be the fact, then, as we 
have pointed out under Point 1 of this brief, there 
clearly was no acceptance of such "counter offer." 
The plaintiff so admitted. (Dep. 10, 15). We, under 
this Point II further contend that, in the absence of 
fraud, a written contract merges aU prior and con-
temporaneous negotiations on the subject. 17 C.J.S., 
Contracts, 872, Sec. 381. Plaintiff does not allege 
fraud. In Last ·Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 
Utah 475, 25 P. 2d 952, this Court declared: 
* * * extrinsic evidence is not admis-
sible e'i ther to contradict or subtract from, add 
to or vary, the terms of a written instrument, 
and that, in the absence of accident, fraud, or 
mistake of fact, the execution of a contract in 
writing is deemed to supersede all of the sti-
pulations concerning its terms or subject-mat-
ter which preceded or accompanied its execu-
tion. * * * 
And in Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 
P. 2d 769, this Court said: 
* * * Ordinarily, a final contract does 
~ep_resent the final meeting of the minds, and 
In 1 t are merged all the terms expressing the 
10 
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final intentions of the parties and any aug-
mentations. * * * 
We respectfully contend that the letter of Sep-
tember 6, 19'54, written on the same date as the 
contract was signed by plaintiff, cannot serve to 
alter the terms of the agreement. 
POINT III. 
MATTERS OUTSIDE A CONTRACT ARE EX-
CLUDED BY 'THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
Under Point 1 of this argument we have sug-
gested to the Court that if Plaintiff's contention is 
that the letter of September 6, 1954 modified the 
agreement, then there was no agreement, for want 
of an acceptance of the counter offer. 
We further suggest to the Court under this 
Point III that all oral conversations contended for 
'by plaintiff between the parties or their representa-
tives 1nust be excluded under the parol evidence 
rule. This Court has as recently as March /28th of 
this year declared: 
* * * Elementary it is that in construing 
contracts we seek to determine the intentions 
of the parties. But it is also elementary and 
of extreme practical importance that we hold 
contracting parties to their clear and under-
standable language deliberately committed in 
writing and endorsed by them as signatories 
thereto. Were this not so, business one with 
another among our citizens, would be rele-
gated to the chaotic, and the basic purpose 
of the law to supply enforceable rules of con-
11 
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duct for the maintenance and improvement 
of an orderly society's welfare and progress 
would find itself impotent. * * * The rule 
excluding matters outside the four corners of 
a clear, understandable document, is a fair 
one, and one's contentions concerning his in-
tent should extend no further than his own 
clear expressions. 
It was urged correctly that to admit 
matters outside a contract would do violence 
to the principle that one is bound by his mani-
festations of assent, and that, irrespective of 
such contention, such matters properly are 
excludable by the parol evidence rule, -which 
rule, counsel suggests, is one of substantive 
law rather than one of evidence. Whatever 
kind one calls it, the rule that excludes such 
evidence is a common sense rule. * * * 
Jensen's Used Oars v. James T. Rice, Utah 
not reported, 3'23 P. 2d 259. 
Further, this Court has many, many times 
prior to the Jensen case, held that in the absence of 
fraud or ambiguity, parol evidence is inadmissible 
to vary the terms of a written instrument. In fact, 
this rule of the common law has been enacted into 
statute, 78-'25-16, U.C.A. 1953, and the facts here 
do not bring this case within any exception to the 
statutory rule of evidence that: 
There can be no evidence of the contents 
of a writing, other than the writing itself, 
* * * 
12 
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POINT IV. 
THE CONTRACT WAS VALID AND ·THE WAIVER 
TERMS THEREOF ENFORCEABLE. 
It is fundamental in the law of contracts that: 
Where a person signs a con tract, he is 
not permitted to show that he did not know 
its terms, and in the absence of fraud or mis-
take he will be bound by all its provisions, 
* * *. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, Sec. 41, g., p. 376. 
There is no dispute of fact in the case at bar 
that plaintiff made no alteration to the contract 
but returned it to the offerer, defendant, signed 
and unchanged. It is equally true 'that the parties 
contemplated the possibility of a breach of the agree-
ment and made express provision for termination. 
Such provisions are valid and may be utilized by the 
contracting parties to terminate 'the agreement and 
any further liability thereunder when the facts, as 
contemplated by the contractual provisions, exist. 
Ford Motor Car Co. v Rackley, 615 Okl. 288, 166 P. 
427; Ritter v. Perma-Stone Company, Okl. May 
1958, '325 P. 2d 442. 
In the cause at bar there is no plea of mistake, 
fraud or overreaching, or of misrepresentation. In 
such case this Court has said. 
To permit a party, when sued on a writ-
ten contract, to admit that he signed It but to 
deny that it expresses the agreement he made 
* * * would absolutely destroy the value of all 
contracts. 1The purpose of the rule is to give 
13 
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stability to written agreements and to re-
move the temptation and possibility of per-
jury, which would be afforded if parol evi-
dence were admissible. Garff Realty Co. v. 
Better Buildings, 120 Utah 344, 234 P. 2d 
842. 
Plaintiff is estopped to deny that the contract 
expresses the agreement he made with defendant. 
POINT V. 
DEFENDANT ACTED TIMELY AND SEASON-
ABLY TO CANCEL THE CONTRACT. 
Plaintiff's Amendment to the Complaint (R. 
24) reads as follows : 
SECOND COUNT 
Leave of the court first had and obtain-
ed, the plaintiff amends its complaint by add-
ing thereto Count Two as follows: 
That after the executing of the contract 
above mentioned, the defendant advised the 
plaintiff that the minimum requirements of 
20,000 gallons per month mentioned in the 
contract were secondary and that plaintiff 
would not he required to purchase the said 
20,000 gallons per month, and as a result the 
defendant has waived the provision requiring 
a purchase of 20,000 gallons per month and 
defendant waived this non-waiver provision 
of the said con tract and is and was estopped 
from cancelling said contract because of plain-
tiff's failure to purchase 20,000 gallons of 
propane per month. ( R. 24). 
Defendant's contention is that this plea is not 
14 
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available to plaintiff because (a) plaintiff seeks 
to avail himself of matters outside the contract and, 
(b) to so permit would allow plain tiff to disaffirm 
his signed agreement. We think it would be uncon-
scionable to permit a party to take advantage of 
his own breach as plaintiff here seeks to do. It has 
been held that a party may not so do. Morgan v. 
Crowley, 85 S.E. 2d 40. 
Plaintiff failed in his obligation under the con-
tract and here seeks damages based upon his assump-
tion that"* * * I am sure we will use the total com-
mitment in the next year." Defendant was obviously 
not so willing to assume any such thing. If plaintiff 
were permitted to alter the terms of the agreement 
what would remain of the contract? Plaintiff would 
be free of obligation as to any monthly commitment, 
defendant would be hound to stand ready to deliver 
for a full year the quantities called for. We believe 
that any such contract would fail for want of cer-
tainty. There must be certainty, so that the liability 
of the parties may be exactly fixed. It has been 
written: 
"A fundamental contractural requirement 
is that of certainty. The minds of the parties 
must have met. Where one party may have 
intended a certain obligation, and the other 
party intended a different one, and from the 
wording of the instrument itself there is no 
rule by which the true intention can be deter-
15 
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mined, no contract results. "'The offer must 
not merely be complete in terms, but the terms 
must be sufficiently definite to enable the 
court to determine whether the contract has 
been performed or not." 1 Page on the Law 
of Contracts, page 135, § 95. "As a promise 
may insufficiently specify the prices to be 
paid, so the consideration for which the price 
is to be paid may be left equally uncertain, 
and in such a case it is not usually possible 
to invoke the standard of reasonableness in 
order to give the promise sufficient definite-
ness to make it enforceable." 1 Williston on 
Contracts, Revised Edition, page 119, § 42. 
"The court can supply some elements in a con-
tract, but they cannot make one; and when 
the language in a con tract is too uncertain to 
gather from it what the parties intended, the 
courts cannot enforce it." Ryan v. Hanna, 89 
Wash. 379, 154 P. 436. "A court will not un-
dertake to enforce a contract, unless by some 
lawful means it can ascertain and know just 
what the contract bound each party to do." 
Lester v. Hinkle, 193 Ind. 605, 141 N.E. 463, 
465. "An offer must be so definite in its 
terms, or require such definite terms in the 
acceptance, that the promises and perform-
ances to be rendered by each party are reas-
ona:bly certain." Restatement of the Law-
Contracts, p. 40, § 32. * * *" 
Newton Oil Co. v. Rockhold (Colo.), 176 P. 
2d 904, 908. 
Under plaintiff's contention could there have 
been a meeting of the minds as to quantity? in 
People ,ex rel. Heartburg, et al. v. Interstate Engin-
16 
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eering and Construction Company, et al., 75 P. 2d 
997, 999, the Idaho Supreme Court wrote: 
If an agreement be so vague and indefin-
ite that it is not possible to collect the full 
intent of the parties it is void; for neither 
the Court nor the Jury can make an agree-
ment for the parties. * * * 
The "counter offer", if such it was, is totally 
lacking in certainty and expresses nothing more 
than a "hope" on the part of plaintiff that he could 
fulfill the contract- the terms of which were com-
pletely satisfactory to him at the time he read, 
studied and signed it. ( Dep. 9, 10) . 
Further, and finally, defendant respectfully 
contends that there was no "waiver" of the mini-
mum quantity provision of the contract. 'There was 
no act on behalf of the defendant here such as could 
be construed as having misled the plaintiff into 
the belief that the purchase of minimum monthly 
quantities of LP gas would be waived. The contract 
called for a minimum purchase of 240,000 gallons 
of gas over the twelve months of its life; when, 
after the first two months and up to the seventeenth 
day of the third month plaintiff had not performed 
and it became apparent to defendant that plaintiff 
could not or would not perform, it was timely and 
seasonable on the part of defendant to cancel the 
contract. 
The general rule is : 
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Acceptance of defective performance of 
a condition or promise does not operate as an 
assent to receive further similar performance 
except where successive acceptances of such 
performance justify the belief that perform-
ance of that character is satisfactory, and 
induced thereby the party rendering per-
formance materially changes his position. 
Comment: 
a. Acceptance of defective installments 
of performance is insufficient evidence to jus-
tify a belief that such performance is satis-
factory, unless a reasonable person would in-
fer from successive acceptances that perform-
ance of that character was satisfactory. This 
is a question the answer to which depends 
on the differing facts of each case. (Restate-
ment of Contracts, Sec. 300.) 
In Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d. 124, 270 P. 
2d 442, 445, our high Court ruled on the direct issue 
here and held that there was no "waiver" of the tir1e 
for payment condition of the contract. Applying 
the rule of Sec. 300, Restatement of Contracts, the 
Court rejected the appellant's contention that the 
acceptance of prior delinquent payments constituted 
a waiver of the forfeiture provision of the contract. 
The court went on to say: 
In Christy v. Child, supra, we recognized 
the principle that acceptance of delinquent 
payments may well result in a waiver of the 
ordinary "time is of the essence" clause since 
by such conduct the vendor has led the vendee 
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into the belief that the vendor will continue 
to waive the strict performance of the con-
tract. Such a situation does not here exist, 
regardless of the effect of the provision of the 
contract that acceptance of late payments will 
not constitute a waiver of the rights to pay-
ment on specified dates, for the vendee was 
not rnisled in to such belief by the vendor. 
Corpus Juris Secundum, while recognizing the 
rule that a breach may be waived as a ground for 
rescission by conduct inconsistent with an intention 
to take advantage of it goes on to state: 
* * * The allowance of additional time to 
comply with the contract is not a waiver of 
the right to rescind where the breach is con-
tinuing and the other party has not acted to 
his prejudice. * * * Contracts, 17 C.J.S., Sec. 
447, P. 928. 
'The Supreme Court of the State of Washington 
said as to waiver in a somewhat analogous cause to 
the one at bar: 
* * * Appellant likewise urges that res-
pondent waived performance * * *. The record 
is replete with his promises to perform that 
work immediately if she would not cancel the 
contract. He was a very "promising" young 
man but did not fulfill his promises. * * * 
None of the delays in which respondent reluc-
tantly acquiesced, on his assurance that he 
was doing the best he could, constituted a 
waiver of her right to cancel this contract 
* * * Knatv.~ld v. Rydman, 182 P. 2d 9. 
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CONCLUSION 
The case should be remanded to the Court be-
low with instruction to grant the motion for sum-
mary judgment; appellant should be awarded his 
costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN and ALLEN 
WAL'TER L. BUDGE 
Attorneys for Petitioner and 
Appellant. 
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